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Authors:
Francesco Greco, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6706-6202 Professor, Behavioral Economist, University of Niccolò Cusano, Rome, Italy Lucio Matta, PhD student, University of Salerno, Italy
Pages: 42-46
Language: English
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21272/bel.5(3).42-46.2021
Received: 18.07.2021
Accepted: 01.09.2021
Published: 13.09.2021
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Abstract
The economic action of any individual seems to be guided by psychological components belonging, often more to the sphere of the intuitive rather than to the logical mind. Cognitive Economics, unlike other critical approaches to neoclassical rationality, is aware of this reality and moves the center of gravity of the theory of the mind of the economic actor from the aspects of conscious, explicit, intentional, and rational towards the tacit, sub-conscious, intuitive and emotional. Cognitive Economics, as empirical theory, par excellence, does not refuse to consider the contribution of the mind to an economic decision. The role of the psyche in many situations of choice is undeniable. It is not, however, the only cognitive reality responsible for economic choices. From this point of view, the concept of limited rationality, remaining within a vision of intentionality in cognitive activities, loses much of its explanatory capacity. One of the motives for economic action is limited rationality because there is not enough computational capacity for calculating the consciousness and the intentions of the human mind. Rationality is also limited through the influence of intuitive, affective, emotional, and silent factors, which all characterize what we have called the intuitive mind. The economic actor’s mind theory is based on cognitive duplicity, integrating the insensitive and the intuitive component depending on the situations and contexts of a decision. However, there are few situations in which we can say that the insensitive component takes the decision without influence of that intuitive. A small part of the mind emerges to the surface image of the economic actor, which characterizes some of the intuitive. But it rests on the larger submerged body of the mind, which is not visible but responsible for guiding the inferential paths of homo-economicus. The’ cognitive economy assumes that this duality of the human mind and the primacy of the intuitive component explains economic action.
Keywords: Theory of Chaos, Complex Systems, Deductive Rationality, Psycho-Economy Themes, Persuasion, Decision-Making, Heuristic-Decision.
JEL Classification: D91, G41.
Cite as: Greco, F., Matta, L. (2021). Entangled Entrepreneurial Competitiveness Advantage: An Opinion Paper. Business Ethics and Leadership, 5(3), 42-46. https://doi.org/10.21272/bel.5(3).42-46.2021
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
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